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This research project takes a broad look at the developing role of information in society and warfare. It develops a view of information in 21st century conflict and information as 21st century conflict. It then traces the development of the Army's information-related personnel structures to assess whether they have evolved sufficiently to address these developments. After identifying challenges with the current Army organization, the paper identifies three alternatives. The first alternative is to form a monolithic information corps, the second is to form a multi-functional information corps, and the third alternative is to outsource information warfare to the joint community while retaining traditional information-in-warfare capabilities. In light of the strategic environment and impending fiscal constraints, the author recommends consolidation of the Army's information-related branches and career fields into a monolithic information corps. This alternative best postures the Army information workforce for future growth, development, and employment.
Organizing The Army For Information Warfare
Information Operations and its context need a foundational re-think.
-BG Huba Wass de Czege 1 In 1997 the Army established the Information Operations 2 Career Field to meet the challenges of 21st Century Warfare. Bill Clinton was President. The Army's operational construct was Air-Land Battle. Microsoft was loaning Apple money to save it from bankruptcy, and the internet bubble was beginning its three-year run. The US was one year away from budget surplus, and only one in four US adults had access to the internet. A great deal has changed since 1997. Unified Land Operations is the Army's operational construct. Apple is worth more than Microsoft. 3 The government is running a 1.1 trillion dollar deficit, and nine of ten US adults have access to high speed internet. 4 The question is whether the Army has adapted itself and its people to take advantage of the growth, complexity, and ubiquity of the information age?
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This research project characterizes and assesses the role of information in and as 21st century conflict. It also directly addresses whether the current Army personnel model has evolved sufficiently, within present constraints, to produce Soldiers who are ready for information age warfare. The goal is to generate viable Army options that are suitable for the strategic environment in light of impending fiscal constraints, and to generate thoughtful consideration of the operable alternatives at senior levels of the Army. The Army needs to thoughtfully address the roles and relationships for all of its information-related capabilities and their relationship to joint capabilities. A comprehensive strategic assessment of the entire spectrum of information capabilities can help frame the necessary reforms to exploit this dynamic mission area.
Information in Society and Warfare
The first part of the 21st century has revealed an age of unprecedented information commoditization resulting in enormous wealth and prosperity. In America the basis for increasing national and personal wealth has tilted toward three industries:
technology, telecommunications and publication. 6 Information is generated, collected, organized, mined and manipulated with unprecedented levels of computer-enhanced speed and accuracy. That information is disseminated across a common global superstructure in near-real-time, traveling at light speed to billions of users and organizations. This information circulates on managed networks or is posted on servers with enabling protocols that permit secure, interactive and informed financial transactions, market trades, control of industrial equipment, and repeatable back-end business processes. Moreover, the information networks are not a closed system. The networks and the information they carry influence people in the streets, board rooms, and command centers.
Those people and organizations associated with pioneering new information production and targeted distribution are experiencing unprecedented levels of social control, and they are accruing unparalleled wealth and power. 7 It is likely that every nation's means of productivity and power is growing or shrinking in accordance with these industries and developments just as it did with industrial power during the industrial revolution. While information, along with diplomacy, economics, and military strength has always been an element of national power, in the information age it is emerging as an element of national power that sustains all others. 8 The Army has grasped the emerging role of information in society, but whether it has sufficiently grasped information's role in the human endeavor of war is 3 questionable. What is irrefutable is that a vast amount of information-related activity signals the arrival of an undeniably real "information age." Things are different. Warfare is different. The scale and character of difference profoundly affects many aspects of our society, culture, and the very foundation of power in the 21st century.
Business is going beyond the delivery of goods and services across land, oceans, and air aided by new information technology. Now business is delivering new goods such as software, web services, and information via electro-magnetic spectrum, satellites, and undersea fiber optic cables. 9 As the mode for production and delivery changes, business operations change. As business operations change and adapt in the commercial sector, the security sector must likewise change and adapt. The issue is not simply adapting to information in business, but adapting to information as the business of technology platforms, publication, transmission, and ultimately influence and power.
Information-In-Warfare
As General Martin Dempsey once remarked, "War is discovery-we must continue to out-think and out-adapt our adversaries. Only by remaining alert to the weak signals of change can we preserve the initiative and provide options for our civilian The role of information-in-warfare has developed rapidly since the mechanization of armed forces first required wireless radios at the tactical level and the doctrine of AirLand Battle acknowledged the importance of the electromagnetic spectrum as a combat enabler. 16 Over the last two decades, the US has made great strides in bringing an information-empowered force to bear with such key enablers as: the global positioning system for precise navigation and bombing; communications and surveillance systems; biometric systems; and lethal, remotely linked aerial systems. 17 The list goes on.
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At the same time, these same information technologies are empowering better coordinated and capable adversaries. For example, the Mumbai terror bombers were able to navigate, communicate, and gather intelligence from commercially available systems resulting in 174 deaths. 18 The smart phone, satellite communications, GPS, and real time social media are all information-related technologies that enabled the lethality and effectiveness of their operation. 19 The terrorists integrated key information technologies, including social media, to employ previously unattainable command and control capabilities.
At the same time, Mumbai's security forces had a difficult time depriving their adversaries of these combat enablers. Indian authorities could not completely shut down voice communications and social media that terrorists used to co-opt and monitor the authorities. This kind of situation poses a challenge for future engagements. It is unclear whether the US could respond to this type of incident either at tactical or strategic levels. If one views this kind of action as warfare, then the use of informationin-warfare has become more difficult and complex.
Information-As-Warfare
As bad as the situation in Mumbai, there are larger problems. Information-inwarfare is not only increasing in complexity, but information-as-warfare is emerging.
New systems of nation-to-nation coercion via rapid, mass publication, unlimited computing power, and ubiquitous connectivity are threatening the old division of labor among organizations that handle this kind of threat at a national level. The goal is not just to more effectively harness information to shoot, move, and communicate in the traditional sense (using information-in-warfare), rather it is to harness information-aswarfare to impose one's will on adversaries.
For example, a number of nations are attempting to counter nuclear proliferation in Iran as a matter of policy. Unidentified political entities are pursuing these political goals via coercive means such as introducing the stuxnet virus into Iranian networks.
The virus, which is information in the form of computer logic, effectively interfered with the Iranian uranium enrichment program. 20 When information becomes a means, in and of itself, to enforce an external policy decision, then information outstrips its traditional role of enabling battle on land, air, and sea. It becomes information-as-warfare or information warfare. 21 Whether or not stuxnet was produced by a military organization or even a nation state is irrelevant. The fact is that it represents a coercive means to a political end, which is the traditional role of the military in conflicts. Thus it is now possible for military organizations to harness information-as-warfare. 1) an air force, if allowed to develop strategies independent from its ground-enabling missions, is capable of winning conflicts without the assistance of other service organizations; and 2) the dynamics of the air domain warrant radically different knowledge, skills, training, and culture. 27 Therefore, to succeed the Army Air Force had to break the Army's constraints in order to realize their full potential. 28 Whether this same logic applies to the cyber domain or to information warfare is an interesting question. The same can be said for the Special Forces Command, which evolved beyond the conventional service departments mostly because of congressional initiatives. 29 While there may be some justification for creating a separate information service, it does not appear likely at this time. The US currently cannot afford such a large-scale undertaking. Also, current joint doctrine recognizes that dominance in any single domain is insufficient to win most wars. It is necessary to maintain superiority across several domains to prevail in wartime. 30 The domination of the "cyber domain" alone will not likely prove decisive in future conflicts. 31 As one recent Vice Chief of the Joint Staff said, "The goal is not the single beautiful target that ends the war in one shot. That doesn't exist… The military needs more of a brute-force approach that allows it to get at a thousand targets as quickly as possible." 32 For the time being, military services may struggle to establish jurisdictional boundaries for the expanded framework of the cyber 8 domain; however, it is unlikely that the current structure will expand to create a cyber or information service. Instead, like Special Forces Command, US Cyber Command will be responsible for leveraging each of the services' cyber capability and will likely continue to borrow and consolidate emerging service components to defend the US and its interests in the cyber domain. 33 Even if US Cyber Command continues to synchronize service efforts in the cyber domain, a holistic framework that addresses the information environment for information warfare could prove more effective. It would include all forms of information warfare not simply the ones that were cyber related. Non-cyber capabilities are necessary to secure our own "information sources" while also destroying or preventing the enemy from producing, storing, and effectively disseminating information. Therefore, constraining US Cyber Command to the cyber domain is a limiting construct.
In some ways, the Army has taken a broader, more comprehensive approach to the issue of information warfare over the last two decades. The Army's personnel organization is the result of deliberate efforts, in part, to build a force suitable to meet the challenges of the information age.
Information in the Army Personnel Structure
In July 1996 the Army Chief of Staff convened a task force to recommend personnel changes that maintain the excellence of the modern army while preparing for the 21st Century. The new Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) had to maintain quality personnel who were ready for current and future wars while simultaneously supporting the institutional Army's most important functions. 34 The Army
Chief of Staff's guidance was to "develop officers to meet the challenges of a changing 9 world-officers who can fight and win today's wars and wars of an uncertain future." 35 OPMS XXI, subsequently known as OPMS III was the result of his vision.
OPMS III organized an Information Operations career field containing seven functional areas in order to meet "the requirements of the 21st century information age.
The Army Vision 2010 document identified gaining information dominance as fundamental to all future Army patterns of operation." 36 Information Dominance is described in joint publications as operating without effective opposition or prohibitive interference in the information environment. Any system that delivers information dominance will require a robust and secure mission command system able to deliver a competitive advantage over an adversary's system-superior knowledge and information management, effective Operational Security (OPSEC) measures, disruptive cyber capability, military deception operations and more. 37 The seven Army Information Operations functional areas included human and machine based specialties from public affairs to telecommunications engineering (see Figure 1 ). These specialties provided the means and expertise to handle many aspects of information in war. Army publications described a need to develop highly trained specialists to "take full advantage of information systems-both on the battlefield and in the institutional base," and to "fulfill the need for warfighters trained with the information related skills necessary in the next century." While information dominance requires broad action across a joint force, it also requires specialization. The problem is that specialization can turn into overspecialization, uncoordinated action and, in the worst case, waste. 39 Achieving a balance of specialization and integration is a difficult challenge. 40 The Army has many information related career fields and branches that are closely related. However the standard for delineating what requires a functional area, additional skill, or branch is difficult in a dynamic security environment. 41 The various iterations of officer personnel management policies continuously expand, contract, and reorganize the workforce. The 42 The situation is also incoherent as a design for information dominance because it does not take full advantage of a dedicated career field with IO-knowledgeable managers. Clearly, the officer management situation is not well structured for information dominance.
To examine potential paths out of this morass, we can look to historical
precedents. An analogous situation existed in the years between WWI and WWII with the armor branch. One historical report describes the challenges in reforming manning policies:
Congress, acting on General Pershing's recommendation, had deprived the Tank Corps, created during World War I, of its status as a separate combat arm. Between the wars the roles and missions of the armored forces in this country as in Europe were the subject of bitter internal dissension within the Army. The strongest opposition to the tank came naturally from the Cavalry whose chief, Maj. Gen. John K. Herr, in 1938 urged: "We must not be misled to our own detriment to assume that the untried machine can displace the proved and tried horse." However, those specialties are information related and might be subsumed in the IO career field to create a comprehensive set of information specialties that include the human dimensions of information such as polling, target audience analysis, and target audience influence.
If information dominance is more than a machine-based affair, then the Army must take into account the dynamic of information interchange via direct human contact as well as network mediated contact. It must not settle for networks and nodes. The common link between human and machine systems is the information itself, which transcends both the human dimension and the cyber domain. Capitalizing on the human dimension along the seams of the cyber domain provides demonstrably improved effectiveness in both areas. For example, well-crafted social engineering enables successful phishing attacks. Social engineering also can provide physical access to restricted information systems or other critical humans-in-the loop. 47 Additionally, human factors can be exploited to discern passwords and circumvent other physical safeguards that secure cyber infrastructure. 48 The Intelligence, and Maneuver, represented a division of labor and a conceptual differentiation between signaling, producing intelligence, and directing operations through the publication of orders. The C 2 function has been replaced by mission command, which now includes knowledge management, information management, inform activities (public affairs), influence activities (PSYOP), and cyber-electromagnetic operations while excluding orders production (an area handled by operations sections of the staff). Nothing is more important than commanding and controlling the Army's vast forces in the field; however, the current force structure does not yield a coherent arrangement in officer functional areas versus core staff skills.
The Army has spent significant resources developing personnel with functional competencies in media, propaganda, intelligence, and communications technology areas. Additionally, the Army recently established a "mission command" center of excellence at Fort Leavenworth to integrate many cross-functional information activities.
However, some information related functional areas are being co-opted by cyber or reassimilated into intelligence branches instead of re-organized into a "mission command"
system-of-systems. Importantly, the holistic, combined arms approach to information dominance is now in jeopardy. 49 The Army has adapted force structure steadily over time. The Navy established an Information Dominance Corps, and at some echelons combined its N2 (intelligence) and N6 (communications) responsibilities. 51 Similarly, the Air Force established officer and enlisted cyber career paths that keep personnel in cyber-related positions throughout their careers. 52 The Navy and Air Force are investing broadly and deeply in cyber-related disciplines. In the Air Force's case, they are doing so largely to the exclusion of the human aspects of information operations. This is understandable given the clear demand for officers who can leverage cyber capabilities. 53 So far the Army approach has not been as broad as the Navy or as deep as the Air Force. The opportunity for Army redesign is ripe.
The Navy model is worth considering as an alternative because it acknowledges both the human and technical nature of information warfare. The vision for a Navybased Information Dominance Corps is to develop and maintain a "battle management capability that synchronizes all elements of information, dominates the electromagnetic spectrum, and permits the Navy and our nation to wield information as a weapon." 54 The vision further describes an elevation of "information capabilities [that] evolve from 20th
century supporting functions to a main battery of 21st Century seapower." 55 The vision goes on to define Information Dominance as "freedom of action to maneuver and act --conduct offensive and defensive actions, kinetically and non-kinetically --at the intersection of maritime, information and cyberspace domains." The Navy concept goes on to address information in and information-as-warfare along with officer personnel management.
For the Navy, information is no longer limited to an enabling role. For example, Navy information-in-warfare amplifies kinetic combat capabilities while Navy information-as-warfare delivers expanded maneuver space, new operational and strategic options, asymmetric operational effects, and capability for dominant control of the operating environment. Information as a weapon is applied to influence, deny, degrade, disrupt or destroy across the full range of maritime and naval missions. 56 The Navy's Information Dominance Corps' junior grade professionals are now required to strengthen and deepen their professional skills in their communities and subspecializations, while also obtaining a broader understanding of cross-Corps disciplines.
Senior officers within the Information Dominance Corps are also required to broaden their professional expertise, and a growing number of senior officers will be assigned to cross-corps assignments. 57 The monolithic option refocuses the information effort via the officer personnel structure.
However, such an effort would extend to the warrant, enlisted, and civilian work forces.
Establishing a Monolithic information Corps is the broadest, most comprehensive approach that could also result in efficiencies. It responds to the present need to harness information-in-warfare and the emerging need to harness information-aswarfare by posturing the Army to do both.
On the other hand, in a severely constrained fiscal environment the Army may need to adopt an alternative that preserves its core missions and assets by handing off what is viewed as a more technical cyber enterprise. That would mean transferring the more technical information capability requirements such as cyber and electromagnetic warfare to other, more technically oriented services like the Navy and Air Force.
Outsourcing critical functions and roles can be a risky proposition, but it might be advantageous to clarify service roles and missions in this dynamic environment. The risks to the Army would have to be carefully weighed because its information infrastructure is the most dynamic-expanding, contracting and changing with every large-scale deployment in a way that the Air Force, Navy, and Marines' infrastructure does not.
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A Multi-functional Information Corps is an appropriate alternative in a moderately constrained fiscal environment. Maintaining traditional branches while consolidating newer functional areas into an Information Branch would not yield maximum efficiency, but would be more palatable to longstanding information-related branches. The precedent set by the multi-function logistics corps helps justify this approach. The main problem with this alternative is that it maintains and obscures the seam between intelligence, signal, and the emerging cyber doctrine, which is a strange admixture of information assurance, cyber exploitation, and electronic warfare.
The dynamics of information, whether transiting human minds or machine networks, departs from the dynamics of kinetic operations and terrain bound 26 operations-so much so that handling both information-in-warfare and information-aswarfare, requires deep expertise at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. 62 It also requires more of the traditional Army specialties. The Army recognized this in the mid 1990s but has not yet harnessed the potential afforded by strategically organizing these loosely associated capabilities. 63 The upcoming century will be one of information conflict and potentially wide scale information warfare. If the past few years is an indication, the role of informationas-warfare will expand. It will also require a new kind of integration across all information-related functional specialties. The role of information in operational and strategic environments is potentially immense, and much like the protection of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and freedom of the global commons, protection of our nation's information capital will prove vital to America's economic and social wellbeing. 64 The correct strategy for warfare in the information age is not an overly technical approach--neither is it an overly non-technical one. The correct focus is on the seams between information systems and human beings. The greatest potential is derived from manipulating how information affects and influences popular support as well as human and automated decision activities at the nexus between humans, media, and machines.
Information dominance exploits the seams that connect people, data, and computers.
Machine processes and human interpretation both influence operations. The explosive increase in the use of social media intelligence is just one emergent artifact of the information age. 65 It serves as a sign post for leveraging intelligence, public affairs, and psychological operations in new ways to integrate their effects. This kind of emergent environment also exemplifies why a consolidation of related branches and functional 27 areas is a necessary evolution on the path toward a more effective Army personnel system.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The information industry is the leading source of wealth in the United States.
Information is power. 66 It is also a national resource well worth defending. Technology, publication, and telecommunications industries process, move, and publish information to produce wealth and influence. At the same time, the information age is empowering other governments and individuals that could threaten the United States' wellbeing via this emerging information ecosystem. The Army must determine how best to harness information and how best to leverage the enormous US information dominance potential.
Information contributes to warfare by extending command and control, shaping coalitions, revealing enemy capabilities and intentions from afar, and enabling remote capabilities that can extend US reach. This is information-in-warfare. However, information-as-warfare is also emerging, and there are unrealized opportunities to exploit its potential. This paper argues for the formation of a monolithic information corps inside the Army capable of integrating all information-related activities to achieve information dominance on the battlefield.
Whatever path the Army follows, it must assure information-related capabilities continue to develop and remain in the arsenal whether in a joint context or as an emergent Army capability. The volatile information environment is forcing rapid organizational changes and the development of new, related systems and processes.
To stay abreast of the dynamic operational environment, the Army must view Information Operations holistically and seek both efficient differentiation of tasks and missions and effective integration of capabilities.
In the final analysis, the best approach for the Army is to resist specialization in favor of a combined-arms approach to conflict in the information environment. Therefore the Army should consolidate its information-related specialties to facilitate future growth, development, and most importantly, employment. OPMS III gave the Army an "effective and flexible" tool for organizing its personnel and functional organizations. 67 It is time to exercise that flexibility to better prepare for information age warfare. The purpose of IO is to gain "information dominance," which it describes as "The Key Enabler in 21st Century Operations." It included operations with the combined disciplines of psychological operations, military deception, radio frequency energy management, and an "aggregate of technologies" that assist in understanding and shaping the information dimension of the battlespace. Information dominance was further described as "the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same."
